Borneo Confrontation (1962-1966)
I. Introduction
The Indonesia – Malaysia Confrontation was an undeclared war between Indonesia and Malaysia backed up by British Commonwealth, over Borneo from 1962 to 1966. The origin of the conflict laid in Indonesian attempts to destabilize the newly-created Federation of Malaysia, proclaimed in 1963. The Malaysia-British alliance who defeated Indonesian army regarded the undeclared war as “Law Intensity Operation”, in which Indonesia was failed to prolong confrontation and attain its objective by kept under pressure.
“Indonesia’s confrontation of Malaysia during the years 1963 to 1966 was an enigmatic affair, less than a war but something more than a mere diplomatic dispute. It began, as it ended, cryptically, hesitantly, and shrouded in ambiguities. In military terms, it was a miniscule conflict, yet the political stakes at issues seemed important enough to influence the destiny of the entire Southeast Asian Region”.
II. The Political Background and Diplomatic Efforts
Confrontation was essentially sparked in 1962 by the proposal of Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, to merge Malayan peninsula with Singapore and the former British territories (Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei) into greater Federation of Malaysia.
Indonesian leader, Sukarno was strongly opposed the Malaysian proposal. Indonesia accused that the forming of federation was only the extended form of neo colonialist and neo imperialist of British influenced in Far East (Asia). It hostile the sovereignty of Indonesia gained independency in 1945 thus threatened Indonesian security.
Since December 1962 there were revolts occurred and conducted by anti-Malaysia volunteers. Further, it created escalation in military crushed and diplomatic relationships between two countries.
May 1963, diplomatic efforts were made among leaders of Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia in Tokyo. June 1963, a Foreign Minister’s Conference was arranged in Manila resulted two points. Firstly, the involvement of the United Nations to assess the willingness of the North Borneo people to merge into Malaysian Federation. Secondly, the three countries would form Maphilindo as future cooperation based on common interest’s issues. On 16 September 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was proclaimed between Malayan, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah (without Brunei) and it immediately raised the tense of conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia. Sukarno accused Tunku breached the plebiscite agreement:
“I declare to the world that Tunku Abdul Rahman is a man who does not keep his word… I declare here openly that Indonesian people not only disagree with Malaysia but we oppose it at all costs… [Malaysia] is endangering the Indonesian revolution… To crush Malaysia, we must launch a confrontation in all fields.”
III. Indonesia – Malaysia Confrontation
The Brunei Revolt, December 1962
The beginning of Indonesian – Malaysia Confrontation was remarked by the Brunei Revolt held by the North Kalimantan National Army (TNKU) on December 1962. TNKU was actually not an official Indonesian Army, but an irregular army of a local tribe from Brunei and Sarawak. However, it was believed by British to be sponsored by Indonesian government, TNI and KKO (Marine Corps). TNKU consists of 4000 men (150 were well armed and 2000 were occupied by shotguns). TNKU was conducting hostages in town and occupied vital targets of Brunei (airstrip, police station, control tower). TNKU was defeated by four battalion size of British infantry units and Malaysian police. Further, the British and Commonwealth forces deployed in Borneo was served by the Director of Operations (DOBOPS), Maj. Gen Walter Walker.
1963
On 12 April 1963, CCO (Clandestine Communist org. or Chinese Sarawak Communist Party) attacked police station in Tebedu (1st Div. of Sarawak). It was defeated by the increasing force level of FARELF (Far Eastern Land Forces) uniting Singapore and Hongkong.
On 27 July 1963, Sukarno declared the term of Ganyang Malaysia means "crush Malaysia". Ever since, small scale guerillas raids from Kalimantan against Sabah and Sarawak. On 28 September 1963, the battle of Long Jawi (3rd Div. of Sarawak) was initiated. It was considered to be the first major incursion between regular Indonesian troops (RPKAD) and British. Indonesian was supported by 200 uniformed force added by 300 unarmed porters, directed by Lieutenant Mulyono Soerjowardojo.
Until the end of 1963, Indonesia’s regular forces involvement was actually very limited. TNI role mostly support TNKU from Indonesian border. TNI train TNKU and volunteers from Sabah and Sarawak (mostly Chinese). Align with, British military operation in order to suppress TNKU caused thousands of Sabah and Sarawak residents fled to Indonesian borders. There was not less than 6000 refugee crossed to West Kalimantan, Further, it contributed as volunteers of guerillas trained by TNI.
1964
On January, Malaysia sent complaint to the UN about Indonesian aggression. During cease fire, the UN enquiry people of Sarawak and Sabah. It resulted to their preferences joining Malaysia which then disclaimed by Sukarno. When the UN accepted Malaysia as its nonpermanent member, Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the UN and attempted to form the Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) as an alternative.
During 1964, there were escalation of raids and power deployed by Indonesian-British sides. Both military activity altered their tactics and employed its best units and eqquipment. Indonesia had armaments assistance from Soviet Union, supplemented by French, and the People’s Republic of China. Borneo Communist Party started producing grenades and shotguns. Total Indonesian forces at that time were: 1. West Brigade: 8 regular and 11 volunteer guerilla companies (companies were up to 200 men), 2. Central Brigade: 6 regular and 3 volunteer companies, 3. East Brigade: 4 or 5 KKO and 3 volunteer companies. In the other side, Malaysia was supported by Britain, New Zealand and Australia which committed to send their 68,000 troops. Malaysia mobilized their citizens within age of 18-29 years old to be volunteers, estimated 500.000 volunteers were counted.
Since volunteers cannot fulfil Indonesian objectives for the lack of training, Indonesia’s regular force begin involved in the incursion along Borneo borders. On 16 May 1964, Soekarno declared Dwikora (Indonesia Volunteers Movement) attracted 21 million youths to enlist. Soekarno also established United Vigilance Military Command (KOGA) to conduct Dwikora, commanded by Air Marshall Omar Dhani. Soekarno was also etablished Barisan Sukarelawan Bantuan Tempur (Battle Support Volunteers Brigade) commanded by Col Sabirin Mochtar.
During 1964, there were escalations in raid held by Indonesian forces. Indonesian began more active to attack the east and west part of Malaysia. They were buzzing towns in Sarawak and Kuching. On June, large Indonesian force attacked a bivouacked patrol of 1/6 Gurkha Rifles near Rasau (1st Div). Indonesia was also jammed British wireless communication. Gurkha Rifles was also forced to against Indonesian strong force, Black Cobra Battalion and 328 Raider Battalion. CCO expanded Sarawak. On 17 August 1964, Indonesian paratroopers, guerillas and marines landed on the southwest coast of Johore. The objective was to be linked with Chinese communist. Ironically, British were able to defeat Indonesian based on local people information. British strategy was then changed by authorizing Claret Operation, a hot pursuit toward enemy targets inside Kalimantan.
1965
On 28 Februari 1965, KOGA formed the Theatre Vigilance Command (KOLAGA). KOLAGA I covered Sumatra and KOLAGA II covered Kalimantan. KOLAGA served as commandeering unit of all TNI territorial forces in their respective region such as Kodam, Komando Daerah Maritim,.. For battle, KOLAGA established Komando Tempur Siaga I (Vigilance Battle Command/VBC I/Rencong Task Force) in Riau and North Sumatra and VBC II/Mandau Task Force in Kalimantan. VBC have more than one division responsible for conducting incursions and raids in Malaysia. Soeharto also conducted special mission that not acknowledged by KOLAGA. Soeharto, under Gen. Ahmad Yani established Special Mission Staff led by Ali Moertopo to engage secret talk with Malaysian government to end confrontation peacefully.
The strengthen brigade from Australian and New Zealand increased tension against Indonesian military. March 1965, Major General Walter Walker handed over its power to Major General George Lea. Claret operations continued undertaken by British and Gurkha. The permitted depth of operations increased from 5,000 yards to 10,000 and then to 20,000 yards into Kalimantan side. Regular infantry remained in range of artillery support. British divided into three brigades importantly in the first division and also change targetting upon only realistic chance of success.
On 28 June 1965, Indonesian crossed the border into eastern of Sebatik Island near Tawau, Sabah. General Maraden Pangabean arrived as commandant and units were reinforced as No. 4 Combatant, with Colonel Supargo as Director of Operations. Forces were 50 regular companies and about 20 irregular companies. The CCO in Sarawak was estimated to have about 2000 hardcore members, and thousands volunteers. In Brunei, TNKU support still existed. Indonesian intelligence also looked for third country routes into Malaysia through Hong Kong, Cambodia and Thailand.
Several other raids occurred within year were: RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat) against Plaman Mapu to overrun company base. , TNI and IBT penetrated into the 1st Div. and attack several civilian target deliberately Chinese families, near 18th Milestone Police station, Several incursion by Indonesian in Katiban Basin (3rd Div.) defeated by fierce actions of Gurkha and SAS by full squadron attack multi company ambushes of enemy river and land lines communication in two major operations, 2/10 Gurkha Rifles operated SUPER SHELL, multi company operation involving two assaults simultaneously ambushed 50 TNI 428 Raider at Indonesian post at Sadjingan (1st Div.) to block Koemba river as Indonesia supply route.
1966, the End of Confrontation
During 1965-1966, Indonesia was economically and politically suffered due to internal dissension between communist and anti communist party. It led to the purged of 250.000 PKI and the forced assigning of power transferred from Sukarno into Suharto. This domestic conflict led to the subsided of confrontation. On 28 May 1966, conference in Bangkok announced a settlement of conflict between Malaysia and Indonesian. The violence ended in June, and the peace treaty was signed on 11 August and was ratified two days later.
To conclude, the confrontation cost:
Commonwealth military and civilian services 150 dead, 234 wounded and 4 captured
British military 19 killed and 44 wounded
Gurkha 40 killed and 83 wounded
Indonesia 590 killed, 222 wounded and 771 captured
IV. Analysis of the Confrontation
A. Morale
1. Motivation
Indonesian independence gained by violently struggle against the Dutch, contrary with Malaysia independence that based on conciliation with an intended graceful withdrawal from British as the former empire. This different background led to be the basis of Indonesian’s motivation upon confrontation as following: 1. the formation of Malaysian Federation was perceived preserve British neocolonialist and neo-imperalism represented as threat toward geopolitical “encirclement.” 2. the battle against British-backed-Malaysia as part of a broader worldwide struggle between New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) against the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS)
To the British Commonwealth, there were three major considerations that based the involvement of its armies, as following: 1. to stop Indonesia’s willing to extend its control over neighboring countries, 2. to stop Sukarno’s influence to forge a new Pacific Union (Maphilindo) as regional power block, as well as New Emerging Forces (NEFOS), and 3. to stop the development of communist power which might create an emerging regional communism block and it would endanger British Commonwealth, such as: Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei.
2. Leadership
Soekarno as the leader of Indonesia has urged the citizen to support his plans to crush Malaysia to guard the sovereignty of the nation especially facing the threat from neo-imperialist. His effort was supported by several leaders, though not all. Ironically, the national political interest was seemingly un-clear immediately failed build moral of soldiers. Chain of command was ambiguous (poor leadership), worsening by military internal dissension and the infiltration of communism ideology among military that created conflict between anti-communist military.
KOLAGA commanders splitted into two interests. Indonesian Army several top officials were opposed the confrontation and not fully supported Dwikora that deemed as a political move by Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) through Soebandrio. Indonesian Army did not send bulk of its force to Kalimantan as their concerns that PKI would use the vaccuum of military presence in Java to launch a coup against Jakarta. August 1965, soldiers were no longer operating in east Malaysia and the heads of the army did not expose its military failings to Sukarno.
The British-Malaysian troops were under command of Maj. Gen. Walter Walker. Walker was a veteran of jungle war in Burma and Malaya, thus he experienced the strategy in combating guerillas warfare along border and in deep jungle. Since he aware to the increasing tense of raids along border, he consistently increased the force levels along border. He was also continuously assuring the federation and commonwealth to give support against Indonesian which later followed by Australian and New Zealand commitment to deploy its Special Air Service (SAS) and Royal Australian Regiment (RAR).
3. Management
As explained above, KOGA did not able to run its tasks smoothly because of lack in intelligence information. There were dualism occured between KOTI (Komando Operasi Tertinggi) and KOGA. Central Intelligence Body (BPI) also was not willing to share detail information since it was labeled top secret. Based on intelligence report, TNI were lack of tactical mobility. The Indonesian military forces were also less powerfull than the British and the only advantages only in the number of manpower.
On the contrary, the attacks led by British through its HQ could be held effectively. The main areas of British operation was 900 miles border between Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah. Sarawak was divided into five divisions based on capital Kuching. Sabah was divided into West, Central and East brigade areas. (see annexes) In April 1964, the British government gave permission for their forces to carry out raids behind enemy lines in Kalimantan, “Operation Claret”, a hot pursuit and pre-emptive action from East Malaysia (Sarawak and Sabah) across the border of Kalimantan. Their purpose was to seize the initiative and put the Indonesians on the defensive side instead of allowing Indonesian forces to be safely based in Kalimantan.
British military were mostly focus in handling external threat along border while internal threat was handled by police and special formed within cities.
B. Physical
1. Manpower
Indonesia employed the best regular army, marines and paratroops as attacking units (mostly in company, sometimes larger). Indonesian troop strength along the border grew steadily from about 2,500 to as many as 30,000 in 1965. Additionally the local people and volunteer also participated to support the military operation as porters and informants.
Malaysia was supported by Britain, New Zealand and Australia which committed to send 68,000 troops. The British soldiers were new generation of the post National Service army. They were not conscript but volunteer career army, so they were morally and professionally built and trained as professional army. The commanding officer experienced World War II and Korean War. Many commanders had jungle experienced during Malayan emergency in 1950s. The Gurkha were familiar with Borneo terrain. Australian and New Zealand army later support as Malaysian force were Special Air Service units.
2. Equipment
Indonesia were utilizing modern armaments supported by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China also provided some material support concerning with the growing strength of PKI. Indonesia used shotguns, rifles, Bren light machine gun, automatic weapons, old Z-lighters, ramp loading barges, AK 47, Bren LMGs and Yugoslav 90mm rocket launchers. Indonesia also had military transports such as many types of combat vehicle and air transportations. The Indonesian Air Force operated air transport, particularly to access mountainous areas over border that were beyond rivers navigable by larger boats and landing craft. Although they had far fewer aircraft than the Commonwealth forces, those Indonesian had were far more capable. They included the workhorse helicopter Mil Mi-4 NATO reporting name HOUND, the largest helicopter in the world, Mil Mi-6 NATO reporting name HOOK, C-130 Hercules and Antonov An-12 NATO reporting name CUB.
The British-Malaysian alliances troops were helpfully supported by the existing infrastructure in Sabah and Sarawak, such as: roads, airfields, airstrips, accommodations, barracks, and harbors built between 1930s and 1950s. British employed Hawker hunter jets of no. 20 Sqn RAF, aircraft to deploy troops (ex: RAF Blackburn Beverley)
3. Logistic
Indonesian logistic was channelled regularly through the logistic check point, Koemba rivers and pathway, which were unknown by the enemy. However, the river was later detected by British troops. They reinforced the operation along the river to block Indonesian logistic. British logistic along with artillery and guns were decentralized in several jungle forts ready to be lifted by helicopter due to the need.
4. Training and Readiness
Terrain and political geography of Borneo gave Indonesians tactical advantage since some of Indonesians troops had even been trained at the Jungle Warfare School. Some of the raiding parties were also come from elite airborne battalions shaping Indonesian troops more offensive mindset. Indonesian volunteers were divided into small unit, Pramuka, and hold their own region of operation. Formerly Pramuka was trained for two weeks but as the increasing needs of volunteers for the operations, the training period was drastically reduced from two months to only one week. The recruitment process became loose its objective and gave way for bad behaviour persons, no guarantee for their loyalty and fighting spirit, further decrease local people sympathy upon Indonesian.
The British-Malaysian troops were also professional soldiers who have trained in National Service Army. The Commander was experiencing jungle war in Burma, WW2 and Korean War. Gurkha is familiar with Jungle War. The later deployment of SAS and RAR were also trained to face jungle war in one-two weeks before its deployment in Borneo or Malaysia.
As additional, one former strategic of British troops was to deploy mobile fire brigade parachuted into Borneo jungle to capture Indonesian soldiers and local rebels, however it was perceived too risky by consuming heavy casualties of British skilled army. The strategy was then developed by transforming and employing 22 Malaysian scouts into SAS. Fully uniformed and equipped, they were projected to held small patrols along border in every 60 miles. Since they were local people, they have capabilities to move easily. The advantages were that they served as interpreter, intelligence serving timely and accurate information as well as keeping confidence of local tribes toward British troops. When an incursion was detected, troops sometimes relying on the border scouts’ local knowledge over tracks and terrain. The Border Scouts tracking skills were highly valued when pursuing the enemy. (see annexes)
C. Conceptual
1. Principle of War
One best example to illustrate the utilization of mass, offensive, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, was the Long Jawi raids on September 1963. Indonesian troops (200 regular army and 300 unarmed) ambushed the Third Division of British in Sarawak. Indonesian had been near the object two days before the ambushed to conduct examination and analyzing the situation for assurance before attack. It resulted to a quite successful operation by killing 5 security forces and 7 border scouts.
Claret operation was the best example of British application of war principles. Offensive, since the operation led British troops chase Indonesian soldiers until 10,000 yards over border. The unity of command resembled from the fact that all raids need to be authorized by the Director of Operations of Borneo. An effective economy of force was effectively applied by the British troops through its strict control upon policy makers and the fact that the operations were conducted by highly trained, well led and motivated troops. Surprise and security resembled on the fact that the operations were held secrecy. Example: Through intelligence, the 2/7th Gurkha Rifles was able to detect and eliminate the location of Yasin Affendi. With surprise they swept Affendi’s camp at dawn on 18 May 1963 and cut-off his party position. It resulted to Affendi’s dead. Another example was when the british intelligence informed by the border scouts that 50 men of 428 raider battalion stationed at the village and fortunately separated from civilization. It was then presented as easy target for assault and ambushes. The successful raid resulted cessation in Koemba River that delivering Indonesian logistic.
British war objective were basically to avoid unnecessary escalation of confrontation to demonstrate to the world that Indonesian was the aggressor in confrontation.
2. Doctrine
Both Indonesian and Malaysian strategy during the confrontation were using the combination of Guerilla and Direct Attack.
Walker formed six principals of campaign prosecutions of British Confrontation: 1. Joint operations between the police and the three armed service, 2. Timely and accurate intelligence information, 3. Speed, mobility and flexibility, 4. Security of bases, 5. Domination of the jungle, 6. Winning and keeping the confidence of the indigenous people. Those principals were following by golden regulations of Claret Operation: 1. all raids need to be authorized by the Director of Operations, Walker, 2. only tried and tested troops were to be used (no soldiers on their 1st duty deployed in Borneo), 3. There should be definite aim to deter and thwart aggression; no attacks should be made just to inflict casualties, 4. Close air support won’t be given except in an extreme emergency, 4. All operations should be rehearsed, executed maximum security, 5. Operations held in secrecy: coded names, no discussion over telephone or radio, no identity cards, 6. No account that any soldiers captured by enemy (alive or dead). The commonwealth should only use minimum force instead of large scale attacks to avoid retaliation, risked escalation, costly lives and also fraught with international problems.
There tactics initiated by Walker were: 1. Jungle Forts, 2. Patrolling, 3. Shoot and Scoot. Jungle Forts was the construction of high ground forts with layers of obstacles as ‘gates’ and cut access of infiltration along border between Sarawak and Kalimantan. Fort was also served as patrol bases. These forts were not intended to be passive and defensive but to dominate areas. (see annexes) Patrolling was held each in 15 days dictated by rations could be carried by each man. One platoon should cover 1000 map square per-day. Shoot and Scoot was an open fire to deter in an immediate broke off contact to avoid lives loosing. Winning Hearth and Mind of People was also became an important key of Malaysia and its alliance winning over Indonesian soldiers. SAS brought antibiotics and conducted routine medical assistance for local tribes. They were also providing hydro-electric plant. It brought advantages since the sympathized local tribes likely reported the Indonesian soldiers’ mobilization through equipments supported by British troops. (see annexes) British also maintained close lialison with civil, police powers and emphasize intelligence gathering.
Conversely, the Indonesians had lost trust from local population, who had witnessed the plundering of the village and the executions of Border Scout prisoners (Long Jawi raids on September 1963). For the rest of the war, civilians tend to inform British forces about the Indonesian troop movements they witnessed. Basically, Indonesian military doctrine was calculated weak not only by Indonesian intelligence but also British. It was proven by the inability of Indonesian to detect Claret Operation as the new commonwealth strategy. That was because staff structure and communication were relatively poor and unstable.
3. Development
Due to the increase escalation of raids and assaults along border, British government keep assuring its commonwealth and international political allies to put Borneo Confrontation as serious matter therefore it was needed support. At the beginning of the confrontation, Australian government was reluctant to directly involved with the conflict, since Australia shared long border with Indonesia on Papua. However though, Malaysia was Australian 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade and aimed to be Australian Far East Strategic Reserve. Australia was only intended to protect Malaysia against external attack. However, Indonesian soldiers landing on Malaysian Peninsula, was considered as external attack toward Malaysian territory. Therefore in Feb-July 1965 until 1966 Australia provided military assistance by deploying 3 RAR (further extended into 4 RAR), 1 RNZR in Brunei, 2 squadrons of SAS in Sarawak, artillery batteries and troops of Royal Australian Engineers. February-August 1965, New Zealand sent its 2 detachments of SAS deployed in Kuching.
Claret Operation was also developed to build forceful troops against Indonesia. Organization was re-planned carefully, thoroughly rehearsed for at least 2 weeks executed with maximum security. Aftermath, Indonesian soldiers movement became even more difficult. The Claret Operation let of the commonwealth troops to escalate its operation into pre-emptive attacks. By fact, SAS along with infantry and intelligence had crossed Kalimantan border since December 1963 to conduct ambushes to induce Indonesian camps away from the border.
Escalation of raids also led to British tactical change by chasing the most realistic chance of success to avoid life loss and decrease raids escalation, ex: river patrols. Platoon commanders’ war became company commanders’. Most of the dispersed platoon bases were replaced by heavily protected permanent company bases, mostly a short distance from a village, ideally with an airstrip.
During confrontation, Indonesian forces were being strengthened with the strength increase from 2,500 into 30,000 personnel. After General Maraden Pangabean arrived as commandant of the new Inter-Regional Command Kalimantan, all units were regrouped and reinforced as No 4 Combat Command with Colonel Supargo as Director of Operations. They comprised 3 full brigades facing Kuching, a (KKO) brigade facing East Bde and a battalion facing Central Bde. The equipment also adjusted for example: KKO brigade had BTR-50, APCs, amphibious PT-76, light tanks, BRDM-2, amphibious reconnaissance vehicles and 122mm Howitizers. The Indonesians tactics also changed by laid down thousands of anti-personal mines against the Western Bde of British in expanding its operation area
V. Conclusion.
British-backed-Malaysia versus Indonesian military forces was relatively having similar power of Balance during 1960s. British were supported by its commonwealth military force. Troops and commander in duties were professional, highly trained, well motivated, and experienced with Jungle-war terrain and guerillas raids. The moral of the troops were consistently maintained due to strict control of policy makers. Additional man power later found to be very effective in its intelligence function. Winning local people hearth and mind was the British supreme that gave intelligence and support advantage.
Similarly, Indonesian was also considered having its best military power at that time. If British did not consider Indonesian force as significantly threatening, British wont ask the support from its alliances and will be completely dependent upon its own military power. During confrontation, Indonesian armaments were supported by Russia, China, and France. Indonesian military was the best trained troops in Jungle war. One big mistake of Indonesian war conceptual was its failure to maintain the consistency of training to abundant volunteers.
Further, Indonesian resignation from the United Nation was worsening Indonesian stance the world diplomacy. Indonesia was not fully supported by Russia and China that was seemingly shared the common ideological base, communism. The cut of American aid immediately stroked Indonesian economy and influenced Indonesian military force. Within national scope, Sukarno was failed to gain full support from anti-communist party. Actually, most of Indonesia top military levels were against confrontation.
Internal dissension occurred that led to the split of military power to secure Indonesian national security against PKI. Indonesian military support in Borneo border by focus were reduced while British troops were still consistently maintain the increasing force to move Indonesian troops far back from border.
To conclude, Indonesia was having equal opportunity to win the confrontation and gained its objectives as British, due to the equal military balance and abundant man power. However, its ambiguous policy maker’s objectives and unity of command resulted to the military lack of motivation, worsening by the limitation of military mobilization as caused of internal dissension and poor economical condition, put Indonesia loss in confrontation.
